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Abstract 
This analysis examines the effect of collective bargaining on teacher pay in the light of an early 
theory of teacher bargaining power. Trends in the salaries of teachers are discussed, and the 
methodology and results of major studies are critically analyzed. The problems with existing 
research are noted and suggestions for researchers and all partisans are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The Effect of Collective 
Bargaining on Teacher Pay, 3 
 
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, many observers predicted that the growth of collective 
bargaining in public education would lead to significant salary gains for organized teachers. 
Some scholars who held this view theorized that teacher organizations would be much less 
constrained by market factors than unions in the private sector. The lack of market constraints 
would enable organized teachers to achieve a level of bargaining power not generally 
possessed by unions in the private sector. In addition, teacher bargaining power would be 
enhanced by the ability of teacher organizations to operate more effectively in the political 
arena than private-sector unions. 
This view was expressed most forcefully in a well-known book by Wellington and 
Winter, who argued that: 
 ... to the extent union power is delimited by market or other forces in the public 
sector, these constraints do not come into play nearly as quickly as in the private 
.... Market-imposed unemployment is an important restraint on unions in the 
private sector. In the public sector, the trade-off between benefits and 
employment seems much less important. Government does not generally sell a 
product the demand/or which is closely related to price. There are usually not 
close substitutes/or the products and services provided by government and the 
demand/or them is relatively inelastic. 2 
Non-union competitors-actual or potential-according to Wellington and Winter, limit union 
demands in the private sector. "But no such restraint limits the demands of public employee 
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unions." Consequently, the "transplant" of the private-sector model of collective bargaining to 
the public sector "would leave competing groups in the political process at a permanent and 
substantial disadvantage," claimed Wellington and Winter. 3 
If this theory of public-sector bargaining is valid, one would expect to observe 
compensation levels for organized teachers substantially above the levels they would have 
obtained if they had never engaged in collective bargaining. This paper will review the sizable 
body of empirical research that has examined the effect of teacher bargaining on salaries. 4 The 
consensus view in this research is that teacher bargaining has not resulted in significant salary 
gains for organized teachers. Rather, the effect of teacher bargaining on salaries appears to 
have been extremely modest-possibly even nonexistent-and clearly less than the overall effect 
of private-sector unionism on private-sector wages. 
The existing research is subject to criticism and qualification. But if, in fact, teacher 
organizations have had only a minor effect on salaries, what is the explanation? Why have the 
expectations of the prognosticators of the 1960s not been supported by subsequent empirical 
research? After a review of the evidence on teacher salaries, an attempt will be made to 
answer these questions. It should be noted at the outset that this paper will focus only on 
teacher salaries even though salaries are only one part (albeit the most important part) of the 
total compensation package. This focus on salaries is necessitated by the virtual absence of 
systematic research on the effects of teacher bargaining on pensions, health insurance, and 
other "fringe" benefits. 5 
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TRENDS IN TEACHER SALARIES, 1967-80 
The average annual salary of classroom teachers in the United States for the school 
years of 1967-68 through 1979-80 is presented in Table I. Average salaries more than doubled 
over this period, from $7,423 in 1967-68 to $16,001 in 1979-80. This is an annualized rate of 
increase of about 6.3 percent per year. But the table also shows the impact of price inflation on 
the purchasing power of teacher salaries. When average teacher salaries are deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index, it is clear that the average teacher's real salary is actually lower now 
than it was a dozen years ago. In real terms, the average salary of teachers peaked in 1972-73 
just prior to double-digit inflation becoming a way of life in the U.S.). Since that year, the 
average teacher has lost over $1,000 in real purchasing power (a loss of about 13.4% in real 
dollars). 6 
Another way of looking at the trend is to compare average teacher salaries with the 
"intermediate family budget." This budget, constructed annually by the Department of Labor, is  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
intended to represent the amount of income required for a family of four to live in a "solidly 
middle-class but not affluent fashion." 7 Over the period of 1967-80 as can be seen in Table 2, 
the average teacher's salary never equaled the level of income in the intermediate budget. 
Because the United States has become a nation largely consisting of two-earner households, 
the significance of this finding may be discounted. But the trend in the ratio of average teacher 
salary to the intermediate budget is difficult to dismiss. In the late 1960s and early 1970s this 
  The Effect of Collective 
Bargaining on Teacher Pay, 6 
 
ratio generally increased (reaching 89% in 1972-73), but by 1979-80 the ratio had fallen to 78 
percent.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
So it appears that over the period 1967-80 teacher salaries did not keep abreast with 
inflation and fell further behind the level of income prescribed by the Department of Labor as 
appropriate for a middle-class family. But it is clear that other groups of workers suffered the 
same fate. Indeed, many workers lost more real income than teachers. Moreover, the evidence 
discussed so far does not actually speak to the question of the effects of bargaining on teacher 
salaries. One can argue that teachers would have fared even less well had the majority not had 
the advantage of organized representation. 
One indirect way of assessing the effects of bargaining on teacher compensation is to 
compare the salary levels of teachers to the earnings levels of other highly organized workers. 
In Table 3, average teacher salary is compared with the average weekly earnings of (I) all 
production workers, (2) production workers in the motor vehicles and equipment industry 
("autoworkers"), and (3) production workers in the blast furnace and basic steel industry 
("steelworkers"). The author has served as a neutral in many teacher bargaining impasses and 
seldom, if ever, have steelworker and autoworker wages been considered an appropriate 
comparison for school teachers (especially by school board members!). Yet the comparisons are 
instructive if only because they illustrate that some highly unionized groups have been able to 
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withstand the ravages of inflation to a greater extent than others. The analysis in Table 3 shows 
that teachers enjoyed a substantial salary advantage over autoworkers and steelworkers in the 
early 1970s, but by 1978 there was virtually no difference between teacher and autoworker 
earnings, and steelworkers were actually earning more than teachers. 8 More recent data (not 
included in Table 3) indicate that steelworkers earned an average weekly wage of $433 in 
January of 1980. Thus, steelworker earnings increased by 160 percent between 1970 and 1980, 
while teacher salaries increased by about 42 percent and prices by 105 percent over the same 
period. 
As the analysis in Table 3 reveals, even the differential between teachers and "all 
production workers" (a group that clearly contains many nonunion workers) narrowed 
considerably during the 1970s. Indeed, there is even evidence that the salary differential 
between teachers and other government employees shrank over the past decade. For example, 
in 1971 teachers earned 25% more than other full-time state and local government employees, 
but by 1978 the differential was 19.5%. 9 Some would argue that the large wage gains that 
certain heavily unionized workers have won in recent years have caused a significant 
contraction in their employment opportunities. Whether American steel and auto producers 
have lost their competitive edge against foreign manufacturers because of union-won wage 
increases is a question beyond the scope of this paper. The point that is germane to this paper 
is that teacher bargaining apparently has not served to keep teachers' salaries ahead of blue-
collar earnings, especially the earnings of blue-collar workers represented by notably powerful 
unions. This is probably not a result that Wellington and Winter would have predicted. 
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Another, admittedly crude method of assessing the influence of teacher bargaining on 
salaries is to compare trends in the salaries of organized teachers with trends in the salaries of 
their unorganized colleagues. The following analysis was carried out: states were classified 
according to whether they had a relative level of teacher organization above or below the 
national average, and then teacher salary changes were compared for the two groups of states. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4. It turns out that for states with above-
average teacher organization rates, salaries increased by 51.5% over the period 1972-73 to 
1978-79, while for states with below-average organization rates, salaries increased by 48.5% 
over the same period. But note that states with above-average organization rates paid lower 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
salaries in 1972-73 than states with below-average organization rates. The higher rate of salary 
increase in highly organized states merely allowed teachers in these states to catch up with, 
and finally overtake, the teachers in the less organized states. 10 Whether the different 
experience of teachers in the two sets of states is the result of teacher bargaining is, however, 
highly problematic. 
The fact that states with somewhat lower salaries in the early 1970s were the states 
with somewhat higher levels of teacher organization suggests the hypothesis that low salaries 
may be an important factor causing teachers to organize. If this is true, however, it complicates 
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the task of isolating the effect of teacher bargaining on compensation. In the statistical studies 
that will be summarized in the next section of this paper there is the assumption (either explicit 
or implicit) that teacher organization is an exogenous influence on teacher salaries. For teacher 
organization to be exogenous, the level of organization should influence salaries, but salaries 
should not influence the level of organization. But if teacher organization is endogenous--that 
is, if the level of organization is a function of salaries--the statistical results lose both "their 
casual implications and their statistical accuracy." 11 
The possible endogeneity of unionism requires that econometric studies of the influence 
of unionism on wages use at least a two-equation system: one equation would make 
unionization a function of wages (and other relevant variables), and the second equation would 
make wages a function of unionization. The failure to use such an approach if unionization is 
truly endogenous results in "simultaneous-equations bias." Almost all of the studies 
summarized in the next section may suffer from such a bias. 
STUDIES OF THE INFLUENCE OF TEACHER BARGAINING ON SALARIES: 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
All the evidence reviewed to this point provides only inferential evidence of the 
influence of teacher bargaining on salaries. An accurate estimate of the bargaining (or "union") 
effect requires the use of more sophisticated statistical techniques. In order to get a "true" 
measure of the bargaining effect we need a measure of salaries determined under collective 
bargaining, 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏, and a measure of salaries for the same group of workers if they had never 
bargained, 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏. Then 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 − 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 would be an accurate measure of the effect of bargaining on 
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salaries. But 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 is not directly observable-one can never really know what an organized group of 
workers would have received if the group had never been organized. What we can generally 
observe is 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐, the salary level of a group of unorganized workers that is comparable to the 
organized group. 
But 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 − 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 is not likely to be an unbiased estimate of the bargaining effect for at least 
two reasons. First, and probably most important, the effect of bargaining is likely to have some 
affect on the salaries of the unorganized group. Thus 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 may be higher or lower than it 
otherwise would be in the absence of bargaining. This phenomenon is known as the "spillover" 
effect. Second, it is difficult to match organized and unorganized groups that are identical 
except for the fact that one group bargains and the other does not. It is necessary to have a 
theory of wage determination that allows the researcher to specify the important observable 
variables, in addition to bargaining, that influence salaries. Most theories suggest that worker 
characteristics (such as education, experience, race, sex, and place of residence) and employer 
characteristics (such as size, financial capacity, and other indicators of the employer's demand 
for labor) will have an important bearing on salaries. Public policy, political, and structural 
factors (such as whether or not a school district has the authority to set tax rates and raise its 
own revenues) may also influence salaries. If all theoretically justified factors that influence 
salary outcomes are not properly controlled, estimates of the true effect of bargaining can be 
seriously biased. 
The typical approach, then, is to specify a regression of the form: 
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where Sb,c are the salaries of a sample of union and nonunion workers, the xi’s are a set of n 
explanatory variables other than bargaining, T is a measure of unionism or bargaining, and e is 
the error term; also, ao is the constant, the ai's represent the set of coefficients of the 
explanatory variables, and b is the coefficient of the bargaining variable and permits an 
estimate of the effect of bargaining on salaries controlling for other explanatory variables. This 
is the functional form generally used in regression studies of teacher salaries. Note that 
spillover is not (directly) accounted for in regression studies that use this functional form. 
A diligent search of the literature uncovered 16 studies that use the methodology just 
described; they are summarized in Table 5. 12 Aside from sharing a common quantitative 
methodology, these studies vary greatly in terms of the samples used, the time period covered, 
the specification of dependent and explanatory variables, and in other particulars. In fact, one 
must have serious reservations about some of the studies examined here, but the author has 
elected to be inclusive in his survey. 
It should first be noted that all the studies are basically cross-sectional in nature. Earlier 
in this article time series data on teacher salaries were examined, but there is no regression 
study of teacher salaries that uses time-series data. Most of the studies examined a sample of 
observations in a single school-year; two exceptions were Frey and Schmenner (both of whom 
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used pooled cross-section and time-series data). Most looked at salary levels, but three (Lipsky 
and Drotning; Balfour; Baugh and Stone) also examined salary changes. The school year 
examined was either in the late 1960s or early 1970s. The latest year examined in any of these 
studies was 1977 (by Baugh and Stone). Clearly, then, we know very little about the effect of 
teacher bargaining on salaries in recent years. It is difficult to do a study with more recent data 
because teacher bargaining is now so widespread that finding an appropriate control group of 
unorganized teachers represents a sticky (but not insolvable) methodological problem. 
Next, the studies summarized in the table vary greatly in terms of the unit of 
observation and the nature of the sample. The earliest study, by Kasper, used state-level 
observations. Two later studies (Balfour; Mitchell) also used the state as the unit of 
observation. Some researche.rs have criticized this approach because teacher salaries are 
determined not at the state level but, rather, at the school district level. Also, the use of state-
level averages obscures the significant degree of intrastate variation of teacher salaries and 
other independent variables. Moreover, state-level average salaries are actually weighted 
averages of the salary levels of both organized and unorganized teachers within the state, and 
so a significant amount of intrastate spillover would seriously bias estimates of the "true" 
bargaining effect. Consequently, most studies of the effect of teacher bargaining on salaries use 
the school district as the unit of observation. One group of studies used an interstate sample of 
school districts (Thornton; Baird and Landon; Schmenner; Gustman and Segal), and a second 
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group used an intrastate sample of districts (Hall and Carroll; Lipsky and Drotning; Treacy et al.; 
Frey; Chambers; Zuelke and Frohreich; Gallagher). Only the studies by Holmes and by Baugh 
and Stone use the individual teacher as the unit of observation. The advantage of using samples 
of teachers is that the researcher can capture the direct effect of individual teacher 
characteristics (such as age, sex, education, and experience) on salaries.  The disadvantage is 
that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to control for the effects of other relevant variables 
(such as district characteristics, labor market structure, political factors, and the like). 
There are competing claims as to the virtues of using either an interstate or intrastate 
sample of districts. For example, on the one hand an interstate sample reduces the problem of 
spillover. If an interstate sample included both District A, an organized district in New York, and 
District B, an unorganized district in Texas, it is unlikely that the salaries of the teachers in 
District B are significantly affected by the existence of bargaining in District A. But such an 
assumption is certainly more tenuous if both District A and District B are in the same state. On 
the other hand, an interstate sample complicates the problem of properly specifying the 
explanatory variables (the 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 's) in the regression model. State-level public sector bargaining 
laws, for example, probably have some influence on salary determination but theories of how 
this influence should work are weak or non-existent, which means that it is difficult to know 
how to specify a variable representing statutory law for inclusion in the estimating equation. 
Use of an intrastate sample of districts does not present this difficulty since state-level laws and 
policies presumably apply equally to all districts in the state. Problems of accounting for the 
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influence of variations in school district governance, state funding formulas, and political 
factors on teacher salaries are also more readily handled if an intrastate sample is used. 
It also happens that the studies that have used interstate samples have examined only 
big-city school districts. This obviously limits the generality of these studies' findings. But it is 
equally difficult to generalize on the basis of a study that examines teacher salaries in the 
school districts of only one state. 
Turning to the measures of teacher salaries used in the various studies, their major 
limitation has already been noted: namely, the failure to account for the entire compensation 
package, salaries and fringe benefits alike. 13 This failing is certainly not unique to research on 
teacher compensation, since it is characteristic of most of the research on the effects of 
private-sector unions on earnings. 14 Another critical failing is the lack of evidence on the 
effects of teacher bargaining on noneconomic outcomes. Many practitioners and scholars alike 
believe that the most significant effects of collective bargaining are in the areas of job security, 
work rules, and the establishment of due process for employees. In fact, some scholars have 
recently demonstrated that collective bargaining is often (but not always) associated with 
increases in worker productivity and decreases in turnover-effects that spell real benefits for 
unionized employers. 15 But there is no evidence on the relationship between bargaining, on 
the one hand, and turnover and productivity (more precisely, teacher performance and 
effectiveness), on the other, in public education. 
The studies summarized in Table 5 looked only at salaries, but they differ in the precise 
salary measure(s) used. Some used only base salary (BA minimum), others used base salary plus 
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certain other salary figures in the teacher salary schedule, and still others used measures of 
average salary. Again, there are pros and cons on which is the best salary measure to use. In the 
article that this author wrote with Drotning, it was argued that "use of the teacher salary scale 
is particularly appropriate, since this is normally the subject of direct negotiation in collective 
bargaining." 16 But it was pointed out that since a district's actual salary costs depend on the 
placement of teachers within the schedule (i.e., on the characteristics of the teacher workforce 
in terms of experience and earned credits), the use of scheduled salaries may give a misleading 
picture of the true economic benefits (and costs) of teacher bargaining. The average salary 
actually paid is a much better index of those costs and benefits even though average salary is 
not the direct subject of negotiations. 17 
The use of an array of figures from the salary schedule, however, allows inferences to be 
drawn about the effects of bargaining on differentials between more senior and less senior 
teachers. 18 Studies that have focused only on the BA minimum cannot be used to draw 
conclusions about the effects of bargaining on the salaries of long-service teachers or teachers 
with master's degrees. As teacher hiring declined in the 1970s, the BA minimum became an 
increasingly irrelevant figure for many school districts. Any scholar who undertakes a study of 
the effects of bargaining on teacher salaries using data from the late 1970s would almost 
certainly produce meaningless results if she or she focused only on the BA minimum. 
An important consideration is that of the selection of the variable used to measure the 
"union" or "bargaining" effect. The specification of this variable is critical since it is the 
coefficient of this variable that must be used to estimate the effect of bargaining on salaries. 
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Basically two types of variables have been used: one type uses membership in a teacher 
organization as a measure, and the other type is based on whether teachers are covered by 
collective bargaining negotiations or contracts. In the first category, for example, Baird and 
Landon used two variables; the first measuring the proportion of teachers who were members 
of the NEA and the second measuring the proportion of teachers who were members of the 
AFT. Their study is the only one that tried to compare the effects of AFT membership versus 
NEA membership on teacher salaries. In the second category, district-level studies have 
generally used a so-called "dummy" variable that classified districts on the basis of whether 
they did or did not have a collective bargaining contract. Some state-level studies have used the 
proportion of the state's teachers covered by a contract (Kasper; Balfour). Several studies have 
tried to distinguish different types of contracts (Balfour; Gustman and Segal; Holmes), 
particularly whether the contract merely provided recognition or was more substantive in 
nature. Two other studies (Baird and Landon; Chambers) measured the bargaining effect on the 
basis of whether formal negotiations were held, regardless of whether such negotiations 
resulted in a signed contract. 
Whether the researcher should use a measure based on membership in a teacher 
organization or coverage by a collective agreement (or some variant of either) depends on the 
question the researcher is trying to answer. Presumably, the existence of a strong teacher 
organization can influence salary levels even if the organization does not engage in actual 
bargaining with the district. In the absence of formal bargaining, teachers must rely primarily on 
lobbying and presentations to school boards to achieve their salary objectives. If the researcher 
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is not really interested in the effects of bargaining, but rather in the effects of organized 
representation on teacher salaries, a membership-based measure of the "union" effect is 
perfectly acceptable. But if the researcher is in fact interested in the effects of bargaining then 
some measure indicating either the occurrence of bargaining or the existence of a contract 
must be used. 
No information on the other explanatory variables used in these studies is included in 
Table 5. Exactly which control variables should be entered into the estimating equations is a 
subject deserving extended discussion, but it will be given only cursory treatment here. 
Nevertheless, a correct specification of the regression is critical to the accuracy of estimates of 
the bargaining effect and depends on the researcher's theory of teacher salary determination. 
Some researchers have used an economic (or market) theory, others have used a bargaining 
theory, and still others have used ad hoc theorizing to select their explanatory variables. The 
last approach, although common, is least satisfactory. Biases in the estimates of bargaining 
effects are more likely if the researcher has not based the specification of his or her estimating 
equations on sound theoretical reasoning. 
Certain independent variables have been used with great frequency. They include 
measures of: 
I. The district's ability to pay (e.g., state aid, "true" tax rates, and so forth). 
2. Labor market structure (particularly, measures of the district's "monopsony 
power'}. 
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3. The area's per capita or median income. 
4. Alternative wage rates in the relevant labor market (e.g., the wages of 
managers, accountants, or other white collar workers). 
5. Size (number of students in the district, population in area, and so forth). 
6. Working conditions (pupil/ teacher ratio, location of district, and so forth). 
7. Characteristics of the teacher workforce (average years of service of teachers 
in district, percentage of teachers with Master's degree, and so forth). 
 
There are clearly other technical questions that must be addressed by the researcher. 
For example, one important issue is the proper functional form of the estimating equation. 
Most researchers have used additive models, but some have argued that either a logarithmic or 
log-linear model is more appropriate. 19 Most have also used reduced-form, ordinary least-
squares (OLS) models, which may not be appropriate if any of the independent variables are 
considered to be endogenous. Hall and Carroll, for example, used a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) model: they assumed that teacher salaries and class size are simultaneously determined 
through the bargaining process. It has already been noted that a 2SLS model would be 
appropriate if unionism is considered an endogenous variable. But the use of simultaneous 
equations obviously complicates the researcher's modeling and estimation procedures. 
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STUDIES OF THE INFLUENCE OF TEACHER BARGAINING ON SALARIES: RESULTS 
Although the research designs of the studies summarized in Table 5 vary greatly, the 
findings are remarkably consistent. The general conclusion that one must reach is that teacher 
bargaining has increased salaries above levels that otherwise would have prevailed, but that 
these increases have been rather modest. 
Note that the terms "significant" and "insignificant" in the last column of Table 5 refer to 
whether the regression coefficients of the "union" or "bargaining" variables in the regression 
equations proved to be statistically significant or not. In more than half of the studies, the 
effects of bargaining or unionism on teacher salaries was insignificant in most of the statistical 
tests employed by the authors. Strictly speaking, this means that these researchers found that 
teacher bargaining had no influence on salaries. 
The three studies that used the state as the unit of observation (Kasper; Balfour; 
Mitchell) all failed to discover significant coefficients for the "union" variables. In the seven 
studies that used intrastate samples of school districts (Hall and Carroll; Lipsky and Drotning; 
Treacy et al.; Frey; Chambers; Zuelke and Frohreich; Gallagher), the union variables were mainly 
insignificant. Even when these authors obtained significant coefficients, the magnitude of the 
effect was clustered (with one exception) in the 2 to 3 percent range. 
Of the four studies that used interstate samples of school districts, three found 
significant bargaining coefficients (Thornton; Baird and Landon; Schmenner) and one (Gustman 
and Segal) found seven "union" coefficients to be insignificant and only one to be significant. In 
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general, however, the four studies that used interstate samples of districts found larger salary 
effects than the studies that used other types of samples. The estimates in these four studies 
vary greatly, but are generally larger than 4 percent. This conclusion is consistent with the 
earlier statement that studies based on interstate samples of school districts are less likely to 
be biased by the spillover factor. 
The two studies that used samples of teachers (Holmes; Baugh and Stone) both found 
union coefficients that were significant. Although different in several critical respects (Holmes 
used a sample of Oklahoma teachers while Baugh and Stone used a national sample of teachers 
drawn from the Current Population Survey), both curiously found that teacher unionism was 
associated with a 7 percent gain in average earnings in 1974-75. 
Baugh and Stone also found that in 1977 union membership was associated with a 21 
percent gain in average salary. On the basis of this finding, Baugh and Stone concluded that 
"unionism now pays." Baugh and Stone attempt to correct for spillover effects in their analysis, 
but both their study and that of Holmes possibly suffer from biases caused by omitted 
variables. Both studies use a set of teacher characteristics as control variables in their 
estimating equations but ignore demand-side, structural, and political variables. The omission 
of such variables probably biases estimates of the union effect in an upward direction. 
Chambers used an intrastate sample of school districts but found larger bargaining 
effects than other researchers who also used intrastate samples. This is largely because 
Chambers measured the total effect of bargaining on the salaries of teachers as the sum of the 
effects of (1) whether the teachers in a district engaged in negotiations or not and (2) the 
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extent of teacher bargaining in the region of which the district was a part. By picking up the 
second set of effects, the regional effects of bargaining, Chambers partially corrected for the 
spillover factor and obtained estimates in the range 6 to 12 percent. 
There also appears to be a greater likelihood that the bargaining variable will be 
statistically significant if the dependent variable is a measure of the salary scale, rather than a 
measure of average salary. Teacher organizations may have had a significant influence on salary 
schedules, which are the direct subject of negotiations, but school districts retain the flexibility 
to adjust their demand for (and utilization of) teachers so as to minimize the effect of 
bargaining on their actual salary costs. Average salary is, of course, a measure of those actual 
costs. 
In summary, the weight of the evidence suggests that formal representation and 
bargaining have not caused teacher salaries (on average) to be more than 4 to 6 percent 
greater than they would otherwise be. A decade of research has not served to change Kasper's 
original conclusion: "Given these small estimates, it seems unlikely that bargaining has 
produced a significant or widespread reallocation of educational resources." 20 This is 
remarkable, not only because it contradicts the expectations of scholars like Wellington and 
Winter, but also because these estimates are substantially below estimates of the effects of 
private sector bargaining on wages. 
About 20 years ago, H. Greg Lewis reviewed all the important research on the influence 
of unionism on wages, conducted his own separate tests, and concluded that on average union 
workers received wages that were 10 to 15 percent higher than the wages of nonunion workers 
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with similar characteristics. Lewis estimated that some strong unions were able to raise the 
wages of their members by 25 percent or more. 21 More recently, Boskin estimated that the 
wage advantage for union members in the craft, operative, and laborer occupations was about 
15 to 25 percent. 22 Ryscavage found that the union/ nonunion wage differential for all workers 
was 12 percent in 1973. 23 Ashenfelter estimated that it was 12 percent in 1967, 15 percent in 
1973, and 17 percent in 1975. 24 There appears to be a growing consensus among researchers 
that, in the light of recent experience, Lewis's estimates must be revised in an upward 
direction. For private sector workers, the union effect is probably now in the 15 to 25 percent 
range. 25 
Why is it that teacher bargaining apparently has had only a modest effect on salaries? 
Why does the bargaining effect appear to be substantially lower for teachers than for workers 
in the private sector? This author cannot claim to have a complete explanation, but he is 
prepared to offer a few suggestions and hypotheses. 
SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
The principal problem in the existing research, it seems, is the failure of most 
researchers to account for spillover effects. If the salary levels of teachers who are not 
organized or do not bargain (𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐) are higher because of bargaining by organized teachers, the 
measure 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏 − 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 will be biased in a downward direction. But there is no evidence in the existing 
studies that a spillover correction would increase estimates of the effect of bargaining on 
teacher salaries by more than a few percentage points. Although it is possible that spillover is 
the "whole story," other factors need to be considered. 
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Some researchers have suggested that the nature of the teacher labor market serves to 
constrain the effect that bargaining has on teacher salaries. First, teacher labor markets are said 
to be characterized by "monopsony." A monoposonistic buyer of labor services exercises more 
discretion over the wages he pays his workers than an employer who operates in a more 
competitive labor market. Some research suggests that school district monopsony reduces 
teacher salaries as well as the salary differential between organized and unorganized 
teachers. 26 Wellington and Winter recognized that public employers often had a virtual 
monopoly over the provision of certain kinds of services, but they did not recognize that 
monopsony in the labor market is the other side of the coin. Monopsony power is not thought 
to be widespread in private-sector labor markets. But if school districts enjoy a measure of 
monopsony power, it may mean that they are better able to counter the bargaining power of 
teacher organizations. 
Second, the chronic surplus of teachers throughout most of the 1970s probably served 
to enhance the bargaining power of school districts. The deterioration in the relative salary 
position of teachers, noted in the first part of this paper, can probably be attributed in part to 
the growing over-supply of teachers after 1971. 27 
The structure of collective bargaining in public education is probably another factor that 
has acted as a constraint on the bargaining power of teacher organizations. Contract 
negotiations occur at the district level. By contrast, in the private sector, bargaining is more 
likely to occur at a "higher" level. Wage bargaining in the steel and auto industries, for example, 
is highly centralized. National contracts in those industries have created a standardized wage 
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structure for autoworkers and steelworkers. Most unions have preferred centralized bargaining 
structures and bargaining units that are coextensive with the product or labor market. 28 
The highly decentralized, fragmented structure of bargaining in public education may 
have served to limit the ability of teacher bargaining to influence salaries significantly. This 
hypothesis is offered tentatively because industrial relations scholars disagree on the links 
between bargaining structure and union power. In a similar vein, the continuing rivalry between 
the AFT and the NEA may have hindered the evolution of a consistent, widely-applied 
bargaining strategy capable of achieving significant salary gains. 29 
Fundamentally, Wellington and Winter overstated the nature of market constraints on 
private sector unions and understated the nature of political constraints on public sector 
unions. The tax-payer plays a role in relation to public-sector bargaining analogous to the role 
played by the consumer in relation to private sector bargaining. Wellington and Winter argued, 
in effect, that tax-payers in school districts could do less to constrain the demands of teacher 
unions than the consumers of Chevrolets and Fords could do to constrain the demands of the 
UAW. 
But tax-payers and consumers differ in several significant ways. It is probably easier for 
tax-payers to organize (into parents' associations and citizens' lobbies, for example) than it is 
for consumers. Tax-payers elect school board members, but consumers do not elect General 
Motors' board of directors. Consumers do not vote on the level of corporate expenditures, but 
in many school districts tax-payers vote on school district budgets. Wellington and Winter 
cannot be faulted for failing to foresee the resistance and "revolts" of ta~-payers in the 1970s, 
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but it does seem clear that they underestimated the extent to which the political process could 
serve even more effectively than the market mechanism to limit the demands and 
achievements of public sector unions. 
Finally, it is likely that public policy has limited the bargaining power of teachers. 
Teachers in general do not enjoy the same legal rights and privileges that have long been the 
norm for workers in the private sector. In several states teachers lack even the right to bargain. 
In almost all states, teachers do not have the right to strike. Limitations on the scope of 
bargaining, on union security provisions, on the enforceability of contracts, and on several 
other critical dimensions of the bargaining relationship have probably had an impact on the 
ability of teacher organizations to win sizable salary gains. 30 
The kind of evidence reviewed in this article can be used-indeed, has been used-by both 
the proponents and opponents of teacher bargaining. Proponents have argued that the limited 
effect of collective bargaining on teacher pay demonstrates that teacher unions cannot be 
blamed for rising school taxes and the fiscal distress suffered by many school districts. 31 
Proponents have also argued that this evidence justifies attempts to strengthen the institution 
of collective bargaining in the schools, perhaps by extending to teachers in all states the right to 
bargain and even the right to strike. By contrast, opponents have argued that the inability of 
teacher organizations significantly to affect salaries nullifies teachers' need for collective 
bargaining. In one report by an anti-union group it was argued, "The individual teacher [has] 
not realize[d] any gain that could not have been obtained in the absence of unionism and 
collective bargaining," but that organized teachers nevertheless bore "the additional cost of 
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union dues" and tax-payers endured "more disruptions of the educational process and a 
lessening of citizen control." 32 
But all partisans should be warned: although the cumulative evidence to date tends to 
point in one direction, without due recognition of its limitations and fragility the evidence can 
easily be misused. The evidence reviewed in this paper indicates that it is clearly an 
overstatement to claim that teacher bargaining has had no effect on salaries. The most careful 
studies-especially those that try to eliminate spillover effects-indicate that teacher salaries are 
somewhat higher than they would have been in the absence of bargaining. What has surprised 
researchers is that these bargaining effects are not nearly as large as some feared and others 
hoped they would turn out to be. 
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1. The author would like to thank Charles Rehmus, Robert Doherty, Sam Bacharach, and 
David Helf man for their comments on this paper. A special thanks is owed to Frank 
Masters, who drew the author's attention to several of the courses cited in the paper 
and offered comments on an earlier draft. Finally, the author would like to acknowledge 
his debt to two Cornell graduate students, Ira Saxe and Tim Schmidle, for their excellent 
research assistance. None of these people, of course, bears any responsibility for any 
errors of fact or interpretation that remain in the paper. 
2.  H.H. Wellington and R. K. Winter, Jr., The Unions and the Cities (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 15, 18.  
3. Ibid., p. 18, 30. Similarly, Summers argued that "public sector employee bargaining is, on 
balance, probably not good for society, and especially not good in a field such as public 
education ... " See, R. S. Summers, Collective Bargaining and Public Benefit Conferral: A 
Jurisprudential Critique (Ithaca, New York: Institute of Public Employment, New York 
State School and Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1976), p. xi. For 
contrary views, see C. W. Summers, "Public Employee Bargaining: A Political 
Perspective," Yale Law Journal 83 (1974):1156-1200; and S. Cohen, "Does Public 
Employee Unionism Diminish Democracy?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review 32, 2 
(January 1979): 189-195. 
4. Two excellent papers that survey the literature on the effect of collective bargaining on 
public sector wages are D. Lewin, "Public Sector Labor Relations: A Review Essay," Labor 
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History 18 (Winter 1977): 133-144; and D. J. B. Mitchell, "The Impact of Collective 
Bargaining on Compensation in the Public Sector," in Public Sector Bargaining, Industrial 
Relations Research Association Series, Benjamin Aaron et al., eds. (Washington, D. C.: 
Bureau of National Affairs, 1979), pp. 117-149. These two authors, however, do not 
specifically focus on the effects of teacher bargaining on salaries, and therefore ignore 
most of the research cited in this paper. 
5. In 1979-80 classroom teacher salaries (not counting fringe benefits) accounted for $35 
billion of the $82.3 billion expended by the nation's public school systems. Thus, teacher 
salary expenditures alone were 43 percent of total current expenditures. These 
estimates are derived from data given in NEA Research Memo, Estimates of School 
Statistics, 1979-80. The only study that systematically examines the influence of teacher 
bargaining on pensions is A.S. Gustman and M. Segal, The Impact of Teachers' Unions 
(Final Report to the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, 1976). Gustman and Segal found that teacher organizations 
"increase considerably the pensions of those teachers who retire after 25 years of 
service," but "have little impact on the pensions of teachers who have accumulated long 
periods of services" (p. 126).  
6. A cautionary note is in order, however. Because of attrition and turnover, the change in 
average salaries ought to be lower than the change in the individual salaries of teachers 
who continue in employment. Consider the following illustration: The nationwide 
average starting teacher's salary was $7,357 in 1972-73. The nationwide average 
maximum salary of teachers with Master's degrees was $18,834 in 1979-80. Thus, a 
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teacher who was hired at the average minimum in the former year and who progressed 
to the average Master's maximum by the latter year would have enjoyed a salary gain of 
156% in nominal dollars, or 41 % in real ( 1967) dollars. 
7.  See A. C. Orenstein, "Teacher Salaries: Past, Present, Future," Phi Delta Kappan 61, 10 
(June 1980):677-679. 
8. In Table 3 average yearly teacher salaries are divided by 40 to arrive at an estimate of 
average weekly salary. One can argue that the denominator ought to be higher (say, 52), 
but of course that would make the comparisons in Table 3 look even worse. 
9. According to the Bureau of the Census' "GE Series," instructional personnel had average 
earnings of $10,248 in 1971 and $15,564 in 1978. Full-time state and local government 
employees had average earnings of $8,184 in 1971 and $13,020 in 1978. 
10. Organization rates are measured by the percentage of full-time teachers who were 
members of a teacher organization. The use of membership as a measure of the 
influence of bargaining has been criticized because there is no necessary 
correspondence between the level of membership in a teacher organization and the 
existence of either a teacher bargaining unit or a collective bargaining contract. This 
issue is discussed further below. 
11. D. J. B. Mitchell, Unions, Wages, and Inflation (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1980), p. 104. Mitchell discusses the endogoneity problem on pp. 104-111. If 
the level of teacher salaries partially determines whether or not teachers are organized 
and engage in collective bargaining, then the union or bargaining variable in a salary 
regression will be correlated with the error term in the regression, resulting in biased 
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estimates of the effect of organization or bargaining on salaries. For a recent study of 
public sector wage determination that attempts to deal with this problem, see A. Bartel 
and D. Lewin, "Wages and Unionism in the Public Sector: The Case of Police," Review of 
Economics and Statistics 63, 1 (February 1981):53-59.  
12. Sources for the studies summarized in Table 5 are given below the table and will not be 
repeated here. Not included in this survey are several studies that attempt to assess the 
effect of teacher bargaining on salaries but do not use regression models to do so. See, 
for example, T. A. Brown, "Have Collective Negotiations Increased Teachers' Salaries? A 
Comparison of Teachers' Salaries in States With and Without Collective Bargaining Laws 
for Public School Personnel, 1961-1971," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public 
Sector 4, 1 (1975):53-65; A. W. Smith, "Have Collective Negotiations Increased Teachers' 
Salaries?" Phi Delta Kappan 54, 4 (December 1972):268-270; and C. M. Rehmus and E. 
Wilmer, The Economic Results of Teacher Bargaining: Michigan’s First Two Years (Ann 
Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan-
Wayne State University, May 1968). 
13. But see Gustman and Segal, The Impact of Teachers' Unions, for the effects of teacher 
bargaining on pensions. Also see M. M. Kleiner and C. E. Krider, "Determinants of 
Negotiated Agreements for Public School Teachers," Educational Administration 
Quarterly 15, 3 (Fall 1979):66-82. Kleiner and Krider, using data from Kansas school 
districts, analyze the effect of bargaining of a number of contract outcomes, including 
salaries, union security, health and welfare plans, grievance procedures, and so forth. 
They do not provide enough information in their article to allow an estimate to be 
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derived of the percentage salary differential associated with teacher unionism, and so 
their study is not included in Table 5. 
14. In recent years, efforts have been made to close this gap, particularly by Richard 
Freeman, James Medoff, and their associates. See, for example, R. B. Freeman, "The 
Effect of Trade Unionism on Fringe Benefits," National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No. 292, October 1978. 
15. See C. Brown and J. F. Medoff, "Trade Unions in the Production Process," Journal of 
Political Economy 86, 3 (June 1978):355-378; R. B. Freeman, Effect of Collective 
Bargaining on Teacher Pay 41 "Individual Mobility and Collective Voice in the Labor 
Market," American Economic Review 66, 2 (May 1976):361-368; a survey of this line of 
research is contained in R. B. Freeman and J. L. Medoff, "The Two Faces of Unionism," 
The Public Interest 57 (Fall 1979):69-93. 
16. D. B. Lipsky and J.E. Drotning, "The Influence of Collective Bargaining on Teachers' 
Salaries in New York State," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 27, 1 
(October1973):19. 
17. Ibid., pp. 19-20. We concluded it was better to use both types of salary measure, rather 
than just one. 
18. Several of the studies summarized in Table 5 indicate that collective bargaining has had 
a greater effect on the salaries of teachers with more years of service and more earned 
college credits. This suggests that bargaining may have served to widen salary 
differentials within districts. In a study of Nebraska school districts, using data from 
1970-71, Moore found that collective bargaining reduced the secondary-elementary 
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salary differential by about 6 percent. See G. A. Moore, "The Effect of Coliective 
Bargaining on Internal Salary Structures in the Public Schools," Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 29, 3 (April 1976):352-362. Of course, this effect would not be found in 
those states and districts that used a uniform salary schedule before collective 
bargaining was instituted. Teacher organizations have been strong proponents of 
uniform salary schedules and have fought for their adoption in areas where they were 
not being used. 
19.  A logarithmic model was used by Schmenner. A log-linear model was used by Baugh 
and Stone, "Teachers, Unions, and Wages," and by Kleiner and Krider, "Determinants of 
Negotiated Agreements." 
20. H. Kasper, "The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 24, 1 (October 1970):71. 
21. H. G. Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1963).  
22. M. Boskin, "Unionism and Relative Wage Rates," American Economic Review 62, 3 (June 
1972):466-472. 
23. P. M. Ryscavage, "Measuring Union-Nonunion Earnings Differences," Monthly Labor 
Review 97, 12 (December 1974):3-9.  
24. O. Ashenfelter, "Union Relative Wage Effects: New Evidence and a Survey of Their 
Implications for Wage Inflation," photocopy, Princeton University, 1976; and Idem, 
"Racial Discrimination and Trade Unionism," Journal of Political Economy 80, 3 (May-
June 1972):435-464. 
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25. The voluminous literature on the effect of private-sector unions on wages is surveyed in 
C. J. Parsley, "Labor Union Effects on Wage Gains: A Survey of Recent Literature," 
Journal of Economic Literature 18, l (March 1980): 1-31. Mitchell thinks the union 
differential is now on the order of 20-30 percent. See Mitchell, Unions, Wages, and 
Inflation, p. 214. 
26. See J. H. Landon and R. N. Baird, "Monopsony in the Market for Public School Teachers," 
American Economic Review 51, 5 (December 1971):966-971: and R. N. Baird and J. H. 
Landon, "The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries: 
Comment." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 25, 3 (April 1972):410-417. 
27. The NEA has estimated that the number of new teacher hires was about equal to the 
number of new college graduates who had prepared for public school teaching in the 
late 1960s. But for the period 1971-79 the picture was dramatically different: there 
were about twice as many newly trained teachers as there were jobs available for them. 
The NEA projects that this over-supply of teachers will diminish somewhat in the mid-
1980s, but will not disappear. National Educational Association. Teacher Supply and 
Demand in Public Schools, 1978 (NEA Research Memo, 1979) 
28. See, for example, A. R. Weber, "Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective 
Bargaining," in Challenges to Collective Bargaining, Lloyd Ulman, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 13-36; and T. A. Kochan, Collective Bargaining and 
Industrial Relations (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1980), pp. 84-123. 
29. But some researchers have concluded that, historically, union rivalry within certain 
industries led to greater union militancy, and was therefore associated with larger wage 
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gains. See, e.g., H. M. Levinson, Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining (New 
York: John Wiley, 1966). In public education the effect of organization rivalry on 
bargaining power remains an open question. 
30. Clearly, however, teacher bargaining is deeply rooted in some states even though 
statutory support of bargaining is weak or non-existent. This is the case in Ohio and 
Illinois, for example. 
31. Mitchell says "there does not appear to be justification for the viewpoint that [public-
sector] unionization must inevitably lead to a looted treasury." Mitchell, "The Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on Compensation," p. 214. Gallagher used multivariate statistical 
techniques on a sample of Illinois school districts and found that teacher bargaining per 
se was associated with school taxation levels that were 5 to 12% higher than would 
otherwise have been expected. See D. G. Gallagher, "Teacher Negotiations, School 
District Expenditures, and Taxation Levels," Educational Administration Quarterly 15, 1 
(Winter 1979):67-82. 
32. Public Service Research Council, "Issue Analysis: The Effect of Collective Bargaining on 
Teacher Salaries," September 1978, pp. 3-4. The Public Service Research Council is the 
sponsor of "Americans Against Union Control of Government," a lobbying group. 
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